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Regional cooperative security in the Southern Cone has 
increased since 1980.  This thesis examines the extent to 
which civil-military relations and economic interdependence 
can account for the emergence of security cooperation by 
reviewing the reductions in hostilities and increases in 
cooperation between the two largest Southern Cone 
countries, Argentina and Brazil, from 1980 to 2000.  It 
examines bilateral security agreements and cooperation, as 
well as the history, foreign policy initiatives,  
civil-military relations, and economic interdependence of 
the case study nations, arguing that both civilian rule and 
economic interdependence were necessary for the emergence 
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The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed a 
significant increase in collaboration among Latin American 
nations.  In particular, regional cooperative security in 
the Southern Cone has increased since 1980.  This 
development represents a change in mindset from the 
feelings of suspicion and competition that characterized 
the pre-1980 era.  Historically aggressive geopolitical 
theories typified this region.  However, after 1980, the 
paradigm shifted and a cooperative security community began 
to develop.  Members of this community no longer view their 
neighbors as enemies and instead, have engaged in 
confidence-building measures, conducted joint exercises, 
and signed treaties, which contribute to friendly relations 
and facilitate cooperation on security matters of shared 
concern.   
What explains the increase of regional security 
agreements in the Southern Cone since 1980?  Some scholars 
argue that military rule and ideology inhibited cooperative 
security (Child, 1990); others discount its influence 
(Whitescarver, 1997).  Some academics believe the influence 
of civil-military relations on regional security to be 
predictable and far reaching, in that increased military 
autonomy leads to increased conflict.  The logic behind 
this is simple.  The armed forces, typically, view things 
in aggressive nationalistic terms.  They then may justify 
their existence by emphasizing the need for a strong 
national defense, and if not counterbalanced by a more 
moderate civilian view, can combine with the military’s 
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geopolitical doctrine, corporate interests and distrust of 
neighbors to stall efforts toward regional cooperation.  
From this perspective, civilian rule appears to be a 
necessary condition for cooperative security.    
Other scholars stress the importance of Latin 
America’s economic opening in the 1980s and 1990s in 
explaining the emergence of regional cooperative security.  
The transformation in global economics that occurred at the 
end of the Cold War threatened to “marginalize” Latin 
American nations.  Southern Cone countries struggling to 
breakout of the conglomerate of nations on the economic 
periphery experienced a profound change in their foreign 
policy and economic goals (Hurrell, 228-264).  This fiscal 
liberalization changed the political-economic landscape of 
South America.  Economic integration achieved by Southern 
Cone countries in turn has led to mutual economic 
interdependence.  Many government leaders now realize they 
need to cooperate economically rather than compete 
militarily with their neighbors.  This interdependence may 
be the basis behind the shift in attitudes witnessed 
between traditionally rival nations and increased security 
cooperation (Pion-Berlin 2000, 43-64). 
This thesis seeks to examine the extent to which 
civil-military relations and economic interdependence can 
account for the emergence of a security community in the 
Southern Cone.  It does so by examining the decrease in 
hostility and increase in cooperation between the two 
largest Southern Cone countries, Argentina and Brazil, from 
1980 to 2000.  Specifically picked, Argentina and Brazil 
serve as case study nations because of their transition to 
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democracy, their history of conflict and their prominence 
in the region.  The fact that these two countries 
experienced both authoritarian and democratic regimes 
during the period under study, as well as changes in their 
economic models, makes them the ideal Southern Cone 
countries to test hypotheses about the causes of enhanced 
regional security. 
This thesis examines bilateral security agreements and 
cooperation, as well as the history, foreign policy 
initiatives, civil-military relations and economic strategy 
of the case study nations, arguing that both civilian rule 
and economic interdependence were necessary for the 
emergence of cooperative security between Argentina and 
Brazil.   
Of additional significance is the fact that although 
Argentine and Brazilian views concerning regional 
cooperative security are similar, there are some notable 
variations in their respective approaches.  Namely, of the 
two, Argentina has pursued a more cooperative security 
policy than Brazil.  Argentina has pushed collective 
security agreements with all neighbors while Brazil 
generally has only focused on Argentina.  Any explanation 
of security cooperation must be able to explain this 
difference. 
Chapter II examines the data supporting the observed 
trend of enhanced Latin American cooperation.  A 
fundamental indicator of this new attitude is the abundance 
of cooperative security agreements between Argentina and 
Brazil, such as signing the nuclear safeguards agreement 
(1994), participating in peacekeeping and joint confidence 
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building measures like Operation Southern Cross (1996) and 
bilaterally reducing defense spending.   
Attention then turns in Chapter III to  
civil-military relations in Argentina and Brazil, and their 
impact on the level of security cooperation between the two 
countries.  This section examines the amount of military 
contestation over privileges, missions, budgets, and the 
armed forces’ attempts to maintain tutelage over national 
security decisions.  The tenuous civil-military 
relationship stressed newly elected presidents and 
potentially threatened to undermine their liberal agendas.  
To ease this situation, civilians needed to lessen the 
military’s autonomy and its political influence.  
Traditionally, military leaders utilized national security 
threats as the reason for maintaining a voice in policy-
making.  Hence, reducing the perceived threat from 
neighbors, by engaging in cooperative security, civilian 
presidents were able to negate the military rationale for 
tutelage and increase their own political power.  
A notable difference exists in the transition from 
military to civilian rule in these nations.  Specifically, 
the weakened state of the Argentine military, due to the 
“Dirty War” and Malvinas Conflict, rendered it less able to 
oppose cooperative security compared to its Brazilian 
counterpart.  This chapter demonstrates the consensus view 
that military preferences have traditionally been opposed 
to security cooperation.  However, it indicates that 
economic integration has made even the military believe in 
the need for regional cooperation. 
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Chapter IV evaluates the importance of economic 
integration for security cooperation.  In many ways, the 
influence of economic integration is puzzling.  After 
almost fifteen years of democracy in some South American 
states, many countries are still struggling with economic 
reforms.  Problems such as economic inequality, low savings 
rates, over-dependence on foreign investment and 
disappointing exports are a common occurrence.  Most 
individuals stereotype Latin American economies, stressing 
political and economic instability.  Chapter IV challenges 
this view, addressing the metamorphosis that opens the 
Latin American economy and its ensuing effects on regional 
security. 
Both Brazil and Argentina are members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), as are all countries in the 
hemisphere.  Both countries, as members of the Southern-
Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), have adopted a new approach 
to global economics, and as a result, have monopolized 
hemispheric trade and gained an increased share of the 
international market in an effort to boost their respective 
economies.  The economic union formed by these countries 
has led to mutual interdependence.  The measure of economic 
interdependence will be the increase in foreign investment 
and trade, as well as tariff patterns. 
The hyperinflation and poor economic condition of both 
nations prior to integration required a new economic policy 
or that of the pooling of resources to gain a greater share 
of the international market.  Success of a common market 
necessitated the reduction of national security threats 
that might menace its existence.  Therefore, in order to 
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alleviate financial demands, civilian leaders worked to 
eliminate all existing security threats that might choke-
off the mutual benefits envisioned from economic 
integration.   
The goal here is to depict the steady increase in 
economic interdependence between these countries, starting 
in 1980 and continuing into 2000.  This chapter will 
demonstrate that economic integration was partly 
responsible for the initial security cooperation and its 
deepening over time.  Key to this chapter will be the 
evaluation of presidential and foreign policy officials’ 
statements linking the desire for increased economic 
opening, in order to cure fiscal ills, to the reason for 
pushing regional cooperative security agreements.  
Moreover, this section will serve to demonstrate that these 
politicians pursued greater military subjugation in part to 
reduce domestic opposition to their economic initiatives.  
The level of economic integration into the international 
economy appears to be greater and more rapid in Argentina 
because of the nation’s dire economic condition and the 
smaller size of its economy compared to Brazil.  This has 
implications for national security policy in that 
Argentina, more than Brazil, is willing to engage in 
cooperative security in order to enhance their standing in 
the international community and thereby improve their 
economic situation. 
Understanding the impact of military subordination to 
civilian rule and economic integration on hemispheric 
stability is vital to international relations theorists and 
the United States as the hemispheric hegemon.  The U.S. 
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government spends significant sums of money on developing 
healthy civil-military relations and economic ties with 
Latin American countries based in part on the belief that 
these are a key component of hemispheric peace.  The 
continuing work of the Center for Civil-Military Relations 
(CCMR), based at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
testifies to this mindset, as do initiatives for a North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).  This thesis highlights 
the connection between democratic civilian rule, economic 
integration, and cooperative security, recommending against 
U.S. foreign policies that undermine the process of 
economic and security integration that has occurred between 
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II. TRENDS OF HEMISPHERIC PEACE 
The Argentine and Brazilian relationship changed after 
1980 from conflict to cooperation.  This cooperative 
transformation represents a distinct turnabout from the 
region’s combative history.  The purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the emergence of regional cooperative security 
in the 1980s. 
A vital indicator of this new attitude is the 
abundance of cooperative security agreements among Latin 
American countries.  These agreements define the essence of 
regional cooperative security between Argentina and  
Brazil which is to reduce animosity and military 
aggression, increase bilateral communication and confidence 
building, and to work together to address certain shared 
security concerns.  The revolution transcends a mere 
numerical increase in treaties, although such a 
multiplication is observable.  This transformation goes to 
the very heart of foreign policy and changes the national 
paradigm from international conflict to agreement.  Leaders 
of the region renewed efforts to work together throughout 
the hemisphere.  This gives rise to the term 
“‘hemispherism’ - the purposeful reorientation of foreign 
policy to enhance cooperation” (Gamble and Payne, 258). 
Proving the existence of regional security cooperation 
requires a review of the cooperative agreements of 
Argentina and Brazil, and changes in their foreign policy 
for the latter half of the twentieth century.  These two 
countries were specifically picked because of their history 
of conflict with each other as well as bordering Southern 
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Cone nations.  The examination begins with a history of the 
aggressive-nationalistic attitudes between these countries 
that contributed to an era of conflict, pre-1980.  
Although, these ill feelings did not result in war, they 
contributed to interstate tensions and prevented the 
emergence of cooperative security before the 1980s.  
Finally, by reviewing increases in security agreements and 
shifts in national foreign policy attitudes between 
Argentina and Brazil, this chapter summarizes evidence that 
cooperative security has increased since the mid-1980s.   
A. HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN CONE (1810-1980) 
Latin America and specifically the Southern Cone, 
before the twentieth century, was a region of conflict.  
After generations of colonial rule, predominantly by the 
Spanish and Portuguese, the War for Independence began in 
1810.  This was a long war and the Spanish colonial force 
in South America was not subdued until 1820.  Peace did not 
immediately follow.  In December 1825, Brazil declared war 
on Argentina over the territory of present day Uruguay.  
This set the tone for years of discord in the region.  Most 
of the major international wars of the post-colonial period 
occurred in the Southern Cone between Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay.  Control of the Rio de la Plata was the source of 
the conflict, and from 1825 until 1851, these three nations 
waged war almost continuously to control this economically 
important area.  In this brief twenty-five year period, the 
framework was set for domestic attitudes of mistrust and 
competition that persisted for generations.  Latin American 
countries engaged in approximately forty-six major civil 
wars and twenty-seven international wars since the battle 
for independence (1810-1825).   
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For the first half-century following 
independence, the region was beset by persistent 
and widespread wars of state formation and nation 
building, both internal and external.  In this, 
as in so many other ways, Latin America 
foreshadowed the pattern of subsequent post-
colonial conflicts and, by no stretch of the 
imagination, could be viewed as constituting a 
security region (Hurrell, 248). 
Clashes continued throughout Latin America during the 
twentieth century.  Border disputes among Southern Cone 
countries were prevalent.  Argentina and Chile engaged in 
the Beagle Channel conflict and Argentina and Brazil 
supported opposing sides in the Chaco War (1932-1936) 
between Bolivia and Paraguay over the boundary separating 
their territories in the Chaco region of South America.  As 
a region, Latin America experienced approximately thirty 
international wars in almost two hundred years of history.  
Between 1810 and 1995, there were twenty-seven 
international wars in the region.  Looking specifically at 
Argentina and Brazil since the turn of the century, they 
participated in four major international wars.  However, 
this pales in comparison to the rest of the world.   
There have [comparatively] been very few 
interstate wars in Latin America in the twentieth 
century, a period when...only nine wars have had 
at least eight hundred battle deaths (Dominguez, 
8).   
When compared with other parts of the world, 
Latin America appears as a historically unique 
case of peaceful international relations.  On a 
per capita basis, the nations of Europe and North 
America, for example, have killed proportionally 
123 times as many people, and at nearly 40 times 
the rate per month at war (Centeno, 121). 
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How can Latin American countries be viewed as unduly 
aggressive and combative in nature when they as a region 
have historically participated in fewer international wars 
than Europe or North America?  The answer rests in the 
separate variables contained in the peace theory.  The 
first is the idea of a “zone of peace,” referring to the 
lack of international war in the region.  “Since the end of 
the Pacific War between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in 1883, 
the South American region has been another zone of peace” – 
this is a negative peace, defined purely by the absence of 
war (Kacowicz, 21).  Latin America is only one example.  
Other such communities include West Africa.  Arie Kacowicz 
argues for three distinct classifications among zones of 
peace: (1) negative peace, (2) stable peace and (3) 
pluralistic security communities.  This gradation is 
crucial to comprehending the positive developments in Latin 
America.  The lack of interstate war is distinctly separate 
from the stability that ensued from a rise in cooperative 
security which is the topic of this work.  Although there 
was a paucity of war, other competitions raged between 
Latin American nations, and specifically between Argentina 
and Brazil.  Most notably, the Argentine/Brazilian nuclear 
competition served to frame the nationalistic attitudes of 
the period before the era of cooperative security. 
The historical absence of war is different from the 
cooperation that accompanied the development of regional 
security.  The latter of these two encapsulates a more 
recent period in the Latin American example, specifically 
from the early 1980s until the present, during which 
conflict prevention and management reign.   
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From the mid-1980s, the momentum of cooperation 
picks up....  In addition to the launching of 
agreements on economic cooperation, the second 
half of the 1980s saw increased stability in the 
security relationship (Hurrell, 241).   
Thus, South America appears to have formed a 
pluralistic security community which is the top rung on 
Kacowicz’s scale. 
B. INCREASED SECURITY COOPERATION (1980-PRESENT) 
A three-fold method establishes evidence of increased 
Argentine/Brazilian security cooperation beginning in 1980.  
First, this section reviews the rise in multi-lateral 
peacekeeping missions by these two nations.  Then it 
reviews all Argentine and Brazilian treaties cataloged in 
the United Nations Treaty Series.  Information obtained 
from the United Nations registry indicates a sharp jump in 
participation in peacekeeping operations and in the number 
of bi- and multilateral treaties signed between these two 
countries and their immediate neighbors, Uruguay and Peru, 
starting in the 1980s.  Finally, this section examines 
overall foreign policy changes to indicate an about-face in 
policy, from competition to cooperation.  The data taken 
together provides proof of a trend in regional security and 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil.   
1. Peacekeeping 
The first example noted is an increase in 
international peacekeeping missions by Argentina and 
Brazil.  This rise in the level of UN participation 
demonstrates a desire among these nations to participate 
actively in the development of not just a Latin American, 
but also, a global security community.  NATO peacekeeping 
participation is evidence of international security 
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concerns.  Its presence also indicates greater attention 
toward regional security issues and an enhanced desire to 
cooperate in order to ensure peace. 
Although many nations have a long tradition of 
relations with the UN, troop involvement by Argentina and 
Brazil experienced a dramatic increase beginning in 1980.  
For Argentina, that commitment has been constant since the 
Persian Gulf War with approximately eighty-one percent of 
the army participating in international peacekeeping 
missions (Pala, 145).  Brazil also has a substantial level 
of participation, and since 1996 for the first time, has 
become the biggest supplier to UN peacekeeping forces from 
Latin America. 
Graphing the number of UN peacekeeping missions begun 
by each of these nations between 1948 and 1996 (Figure 1), 
a drastic increase in participation starts beginning in 
1980. 
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 1948-1980 1980-1996 1948-1980 1980-1996 
 
Figure 1.   Argentine and Brazilian Peacekeeping 
Missions.   
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(From: The Blue Helmets, a Review of UN Peacekeeping, UN 
Department of Public Information: New York, 1996) 
 This increase signals a desire to use armed forces for 
a greater good, the protection of peace and not the defense 
of borders as occurred in previous years. 
2. Treaties 
A list of treaties obtained from United Nations (UN) 
records reveals a sharp increase in security agreements in 
the 1980s.  All participating nations in the UN are 
required, under the UN charter, to register signed accords 
with the Secretary General.  Thus, the UN maintains a 
record of all multi-lateral agreements in its annual 
publication, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the 
Secretary General.  Although restricted to multi-lateral 
treaties between member nations, there is an additional 
database, The United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), which 
includes recent bi-lateral accords.  Multilateral and 
bilateral agreements between Argentina and Brazil, and with 
their immediate Southern Cone neighbors, accounted for 
sixty-eight treaties dealing with national security issues 
signed between 1940 and 1990.  This included treaties 
dealing with such topics as nuclear materials, maritime 
regulations, border disputes and transportation.  A noted 
increase in these cooperative security treaties commenced 
after 1980 (Figure 2).  This trend coincides with the 
notion of increased peace and development of cooperative 
security in the region after 1980. 
Treaty research is typically difficult and somewhat 
inaccurate.  The UNTS database, which is the best source 
for this information, typically lags in treaty registration 
by about ten years.  This accounts for the apparent drop 
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off in treaties signed in the 1990s.  Additionally, the 
information is subject to the participating nations’ 
vigilance in notifying the UN of signed agreements.  As 
such, this graph does not represent all treaties signed 
between 1940 and 1990.  However, this fact does not 
diminish the significance of the rise in security 
agreements observed starting in 1980. 
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Figure 2.   Argentine and Brazilian Security 
Treaties as Declared with the United Nations. 
(From: The United Nations Treaty Series, UN Department of 
Public Information: New York, 2001 
(http://untreaty.un.org/plweb-cgi/fastweb.exe) 
 
3. Foreign Policy Initiatives 
Cooperative security exists today between Argentina 
and Brazil, who in the past, were adversaries.  What 
foreign policy scheme drove this reversal?  This final 
section examines the change in Argentine and Brazilian 
foreign policy commencing in 1980, which embraced 
cooperation, not just between these regional neighbors, but 
also on a greater international scale.  Taking Argentina 
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and Brazil in turn, the review begins on a macro-scale with 
policy shifts regarding non-regional states and non-state 
actors.  Focus then turns to the Argentine-Brazilian 
bilateral relationship and a new willingness to work 
together. 
The Raúl Alfonsín government assumed power in 1983 
amidst considerable domestic turmoil, economic crisis and 
turbulent civil-military relations.  Addressing these 
issues required an intense domestic focus.  Alfonsín 
reorganized the military and subjugated it to civilians, 
restructured foreign debt, and instituted economic reform.  
Nevertheless, he did not ignore the importance of sound 
foreign policy and increased international ties.  Foreign 
policy under Alfonsín reflected a desire to strengthen 
relations with European countries and end historical 
conflicts with neighboring Southern Cone nations.  To this 
end, Argentina finally resolved a territorial dispute with 
Chile and approved the Beagle Channel Treaty (1984).  It 
sought to strengthen ties with Brazil by agreements on 
hydroelectric power, as well as a variety of other 
scientific and technical issues.  Cooperative foreign 
policy initiatives, both within the Western Hemisphere and 
internationally, characterized the Alfonsín administration.  
The following excerpt from his inaugural speech in December 
1983 spells out his policy agenda: 
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I would like to make clear that our foreign 
policy will coherently mirror our domestic 
politics...We will seek social justice for 
Argentines and will not cease to look for ways to 
establish within the international system some 
aspects of morality and justice between nations.  
We will strive for peace for our violence-ridden 
territory and will seek peace for all inhabitants 
of this planet...  We will fight for freedom and 
democracy throughout the world (Fournier, 39).  
President Alfonsín completed his term in 1989 amidst 
continuing economic crisis and hyperinflation. 
His successor, President Carlos Menem, constructed a 
foreign policy aimed at “projecting the image of a reliable 
international partner" (Pala, 132).  The image of a 
responsible international partner not only reaped benefits 
with respect to interstate cooperation.  It was also a 
mechanism to draw increased foreign investment into the 
country and tighten military subjugation since western 
nations recognized Argentina as a democratically 
consolidated international player.   
It is with this aim that Argentina has actively 
supported the Special Committee on Hemispheric 
Security in relation to measures for confidence-
building and for prevention of conflicts (Escude 
and Fontana, 58). 
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Over most of the past century, Argentine and U.S. 
relations have been rocky.  Indicative of Argentina’s past 
animosity toward the U.S. was its rejection of the Monroe 
Doctrine, its neutral standing in both the first and second 
World Wars, and its partnership with Egypt, Iraq and Libya 
to construct an intermediate-range guided missile (Escdé 
and Fontana, 51).  However, under the Menem presidency, 
Argentina shifted to a U.S.-friendly foreign policy.  
Participating in the Persian Gulf War and explicitly 
supporting American interests in the hemisphere, Argentina 
earned the status of a major Non-NATO U.S. ally.  Moreover, 
Argentina’s support for the Inter-American Defense Board 
and Organization of American States (OAS) displays a 
willingness not just to recognize the legitimacy of these 
non-state actors, but also a desire to support these 
organizations in their efforts toward regional security. 
Brazil also adopted an accepting, more cooperative 
mindset in its foreign policy beginning in 1985.  The 
Amazon offers a telling example of this turnabout in 
attitude.  Traditionally, Brazilian security centered on 
sovereignty and border defense issues, an important 
national paradigm, which cemented a coveted role for the 
military in foreign policy.  When it came to Amazon 
security issues, protectionist attitudes ran 
uncharacteristically deep.  Despite this, policy on the 
Amazon changed with the transition to democracy in 1985.  
Faced with rain forest destruction in the Amazon, the José 
Sarney administration (1985-1990), instead of taking the 
typical nationalistic platform, undertook a public 
relations effort to downplay Brazilian concern over 
security issues and highlight their worry for the 
ecosystem.  This policy shift, carried through the 
subsequent Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco 
presidencies, forced the military to adopt a more moderate 
stance on the issue (Hunter, 126).   
Brazil’s search for recognition as a key international 
partner from Latin America contributed to an attitude of 
competition, but this eventually softened. 
During the Itamar Franco government [1992-1994], 
Brazil’s foreign policy went through a process of 
adjustment...and a revival of the belief that 
continuity and consensus was essential for 
international credibility (Hirst, 111).   
This resulted in non-proliferation treaties, and more 
specifically, the Nuclear Quadripartite Treaty (1991) with 
  19
Argentina.  President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-
2000), striving for Brazilian international acceptance, 
sought to solidify its prominence in the hemisphere and its 
role in international organizations by lobbying for 
permanent inclusion on an expanded United Nations Security 
Council. 
Before the 1980s, there had only been five 
presidential summits between Argentina and Brazil.  This 
changed with the Alfonsín and Sarney administrations.  They 
were the first civilian governments after the transition to 
democracy, and the 1980s witnessed an increased willingness 
between these neighbors to work together to solve their 
common problems. 
As noted in Table 1, concrete examples of Argentine 
and Brazilian willingness to work together include 
bilateral nuclear and economic agreements signed between 
1985 and 1995. 
 
Argentine and Brazilian Cooperative Measures 1985-1995 
Nuclear Economic 
1985 –  Foz de Iguazú 
Declaration 
1985 – Iguaçu Declaration 
1990 -  Declaration on Common 
Nuclear Policy 




1991 –  Agency for Accounting 
and Control of Nuclear 
Materials 
1988 – Act of Alvorada 
1994 –  Treaty of Tlatelolco 
(January, Argentina 
Ratified) 
1991 – Treaty of Asunción 
1994 –  Treaty of Tlatelolco 




Table 1.   Argentine and Brazilian Cooperative 
Measures 1985-1995. 
 
There is also an increase in bilateral communications 
and confidence building measures under civilian direction.     
The network of bi-national working groups 
established under the 1986 agreements and, still 
more, the inter-governmental structures of 
MERCOSUR acquired a degree of bureaucratic 
autonomy.... Moreover, the institutionalization 
of visits, exchanges by presidents and officials 
was leading to a broader “habit of communication” 
of the kind that has been so important in Europe 
(Hurrell, 246).      
The first (1987) and second (1988) Argentine-Brazilian 
Strategic Studies Symposiums were held as well as annual 
joint naval operations between 1994 and 1996.  It became 
clear by 1990 that improved cognizance of each other’s 
intentions and the building of common interests contributed 
to institutionalized strategic communications and 
cooperative security.  Moreover, during this period, Brazil 
reassigned military troops by pulling them back from its 
southern border with Argentina.  Argentina, for its part, 
ended the practice of “empty provinces” and allowed 
business and trade near its northern border with Brazil.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Latin American history before 1883 is particularly 
violent.  However, since the turn of the century, a drastic 
metamorphosis has taken place.  The first of these 
transitions is the widely noted emergence of a zone of 
peace in Latin America due to the lack of international 
war.  However, this period of negative peace was still 
characterized by hostile relations between nations.  The 
second is the development of regional security cooperation 
in the 1980s, which this thesis seeks to explain. 
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With the rising participation in United Nations 
peacekeeping missions, and the increase of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties in the Southern Cone, recognizing the 
emergence of cooperation between Argentina and Brazil is 
easy.  Additionally, there is an observable change in 
foreign policy for these two nations.  This modification is 
both bilateral between Argentina and Brazil and 
international.  Whereas in the past foreign relations were 
non-cooperative, after the 1980s, an attitude of 
collaboration defined these countries.  The following two 
chapters examine the possible reasons for this shift from 
hostility toward regional security cooperation.  
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III. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY 
Scholars have argued that the influence of civil-
military relations on regional security is potentially 
significant, in that increased military autonomy can 
contribute to increased conflict (Child, 1985 and Mares, 
1998).  Although the armed forces’ autonomy did not lead to 
war in Latin America, the presence of military rule 
inhibited the emergence of a security zone.  As noted in 
Chapter I, the armed forces typically view things in an 
aggressive, nationalistic fashion.  They often justify 
their existence by emphasizing the need for a strong 
national defense.  The military has a history of 
identifying its neighbors as threats (Mares 2001, 223).  
This attitude, if not counterbalanced, can combine with 
distrust of regional partners because of past disputes and 
contribute to an increase in national security posture, 
potential arms races, and international dilemmas, all of 
which run contrary to regional security.  If military 
autonomy contributes to insecurity, one might expect 
military subordination to civilian rule to result in 
increased security. 
Do the cases of Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s 
support a link between civilian dominance over military 
institutions and the development of regional cooperative 
security agreements?  This thesis proposes that they do.  
Although there are isolated occurrences of agreements 
between Argentine and Brazilian military regimes in the 
early 1980s, it was not until the transition to democracy 
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and military subjugation that geopolitical thinking changed 
and cooperative security measures flourished.   
There are authors that cite a few joint agreements 
between Argentina and Brazil, prior to civilian control of 
the military, and thereby believe that security cooperation 
occurred independently from democratic, civilian control of 
the armed forces (Whitescarver, 1997).  I do not concur.  
Without the leadership and vision of emerging civilian 
presidents, the cooperative security environment would 
never have flourished as it did toward the close of the 
century because of the age-old geopolitical mindset of 
military leaders.  This said, civilian control was one of 
the two critical factors that allowed for cooperative 
security.   
For cooperative security to prosper, its main 
opponent, the military and its nationalistic attitudes, 
needed to weaken and lose public support.  Once achieved 
the door was open for civilians to pursue an avenue other 
than competition to solve domestic dilemmas of which 
hyperinflation was most significant.  As these policies 
returned rewards, civilian control amplified, by further 
reducing confidence in the former ways of the military 
regime’s geopolitical thinking and providing civilians with 
greater latitude to employ more radically cooperative 
policies.  Therefore, as civilian control grew, 
militaristic attitudes waned, and consequently, the speed 
at which Argentina and Brazil agreed to cooperative 
security measures increased.  This upward spiral progressed 
through the end of the century with record levels of 
international agreements ratified by these nations.     
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This chapter begins by presenting evidence that 
Argentine and Brazilian military autonomy inhibited the 
emergence of a cooperative security zone in the Southern 
Cone prior to 1980.  It briefly synopsizes historical 
events among the region’s powers that contributed to an 
attitude of distrust, and discusses foreign and national 
security policy during the years of military autonomy.  
This chapter then shows the foreign policy changes that 
followed the transition to civilian rule and how this 
contributed to the realization of cooperative security.  
However, civil-military relations offer only a single 
casual factor.  Alone, however, it is not a sufficient 
explanation.  Numerous nations operate with a subordinated 
military and never attain the level of cooperative security 
achieved between Argentina and Brazil.  Intuitively there 
must be another variable.  The reasons civilians chose to 
pursue cooperative security, namely, economic crisis and 
growing economic interdependence, will be addressed in 
Chapter IV. 
A. HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MILITARY 
RULE  
1. Argentina  
The Latin American military’s geopolitical thinking 
with its characteristic animosity and distrust of neighbors 
has long been noted (Grabendorff, 1982).  Of all the 
region’s nations, the nationalistic outlook and combative 
relationship between Argentina and Brazil, prior to 1980, 
is the most notable (Child, 1985).  Extended periods of 
military rule only exacerbated this historical antagonism.  
Military rule dominated Argentina from 1976-1983 under 
the Proceso dictatorship.  The government believed that its 
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national sovereignty was constantly under threat from 
neighboring nations.  National defense was therefore their 
top priority and centered on preparations for combat 
contingencies with Southern Cone neighbors.  This effort 
consumed all governmental decisions and geared all programs 
toward the preservation of the state. 
Preservation of the state typically assumed the form 
of territorial defense and led to a history of border wars 
among Southern Cone nations.  Argentina and Chile share a 
long rugged border.  Unguarded and not populated in many 
places, this border served as the reason for numerous 
disputes between these two nations.  “To the west, Chile is 
Argentina’s perennial nemesis” (Pion-Berlin 1998, 80).  
This tenuous relationship came to a head in the winter of 
1978 as the two countries, both governed by military 
regimes, teetered on the brink of war.  The disagreement 
centered on the question of legitimate possession of the 
Picton, Lennox and Nueva islands of the Beagle Channel.  
Argentina and Chile submitted to British arbitration, but 
the queen decided in favor of Chile and Argentina rejected 
the decision.  Armed forces mobilized and only by means of 
papal mediation did these countries scarcely avoid war.  
The effort led by Cardinal Samore resulted in the 1985 
Beagle Channel Treaty.   
The Proceso dictatorship was preoccupied with 
security threats from without and from within.  
Conforming to a realist view of the world with 
heavy geopolitical overtones, the military junta 
believed that states are situated in an anarchic, 
unceasingly competitive, and oftentimes hostile 
environment (Pion-Berlin 1998, 80). 
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The idea is common in both the national security and 
foreign affairs institutions of Argentina, as well as 
Brazil. 
The Argentine-Brazilian relationship during this 
period was not much better.  The two dominant powers of the 
region were plagued with antagonism toward each other and a 
flat refusal to work together.  World War II witnessed 
these two neighbors on divergent tracks.  While Brazil 
supported the Allies, Argentina was neutral.  After the 
war, Juan Perón, jealous over American aid to Brazil, 
intentionally barred Brazil from his plan for uniting the 
Southern Cone (Child, 1985).  
There are more examples of the historical distrust 
between these two neighbors.  Evidence that Argentina and 
Brazil not only entertained the notion of war, but also 
actively prepared for the contingency, includes the 
Argentine policy of “empty provinces.”  “Empty provinces” 
refer to the Argentine policy, which until the 1980s, 
prohibited “valued economic activity” and restricted 
transportation in northern regions because of a perceived 
Brazilian threat (Hurrell, 250).  Brazil, for its part, 
stationed troops along its southern boundary, instead of 
the Amazon, in preparation for an Argentine invasion.   
Most characteristic of this hostile relationship was 
the refusal of both powers to sign any nuclear accords, 
specifically the Non-proliferation Treaty.  For centuries, 
these two nations competed for regional dominance.  They 
were the only two countries in the hemisphere with nuclear 
capability and any one’s decision to develop that 
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technology for military uses would have seriously 
undermined the regional balance of power.  
These circumstances evidently presented a nearly 
inescapable scenario.  Argentina was primed to 
turn its latent nuclear technological capability 
into military power and go for the bomb.  
Brazilian officials were acutely aware of this 
(Barletta, 20).   
Although avoiding a massive nuclear build-up, feelings 
of suspicion remained. 
2. Brazil 
Brazil experienced a period of authoritarian rule from 
1964 to 1985, during which national security and foreign 
policy thinking was mistrustful, as with its neighbor 
Argentina, and competitive in nature. 
The Brazilian geopolitical school [was] without a 
doubt the most significant in Latin America.  
This is true not only because of its impact on 
contemporary Brazil, but also because it has 
served as a model for others and has produced 
strongly reactive geopolitical thinking (Child 
1985, 34). 
Brazilian national strategy demonstrated the nation’s 
desire to achieve greatness or recognition as a 
“consequential actor in the international scene" (Guedes da 
Costa, 229).  In Brazil, the quest for achieving 
international prominence and becoming a first-rate-nation 
shaped the non-cooperative nature of its foreign policy as 
well as national security priorities.  This fact was 
evident in Brazilian protective attitudes toward the 
Amazon, their confrontational stance against American 
hegemony, as well as their support of defense spending and 
their national military industrial complex. 
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To an extent, this insistent desire to expand Brazil’s 
role and land-holdings in the hemisphere served to threaten 
many of its neighbors, not just Argentina.  Two areas stand 
out with respect to Peru and Paraguay.  For generations 
Brazilians saw themselves as an expanding power and this 
included a landward expansion toward the Pacific.  This was 
the cause of great concern on behalf of Peru, which on its 
own behalf, constructed an elaborate scheme of roads to the 
east of the Andes in order to thwart perceived Brazilian 
expansion.  Brazil also experienced friction with Paraguay 
over the Itaipú hydroelectric project that crosses an 
international waterway.  Indeed, the supposed danger was so 
significant that it dominated the limited volumes of 
Paraguayan strategic writing (Child, 1985). 
These examples illustrate the philosophy of hostility 
that pervaded the region during a period of military 
autonomy.  This mindset dominated national security 
attitudes and foreign policy objectives for years.  
Historically, there was a level of confrontation in Latin 
America to which military rule contributed.  The military 
used hostile, nationalistic views to justify staying in 
power (Mares, 1998 and Stepan, 1988). 
External security was to be achieved by 
increasing the power of the state in all its 
fields...The end product of this line of analysis 
was a coherent doctrine of national security 
which some authors have called the ‘ideology of 
the Southern Cone military’ in the 1960s and 
1970s (Child 1990, 59). 
The cooperative environment of the 1980s and 1990s is 
more noteworthy when you account for the advancement made 
from the combative paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s. 
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A few isolated incidents cast doubt about whether 
civilian rule was necessary for the emergence of a 
cooperative security zone.  The military regimes of 
Argentina and Brazil commenced annual joint naval exercises 
in 1978 with Operation Fraterno.  The apparent cooperative 
attitude continued, with a slight increase in bi- and 
multi-lateral agreements between Argentina and Brazil and 
their regional partners starting in 1980, three years 
before civilian control in Argentina and five years before 
in Brazil.  Additionally, Brazil and Argentina signed the 
Foz de Iguazú Declaration, which restricts both nations to 
the development of nuclear power for non-military purposes, 
two months before Brazil’s transition to democracy in 
January 1985.   
Despite this limited cooperation, true cooperation 
does not present itself with respect to nuclear power until 
1991, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained un-ratified 
until even after that.  In short, few cooperative acts took 
place under Argentine and Brazilian military autonomy. 
The lack of progress on economic integration under 
military rule in Brazil, despite overtures from a 
democratic Argentina, also demonstrates the lack of a 
decisive shift toward cooperation prior to civilian 
control.  The Brazilian foreign ministry worked jointly 
with military advisors to formulate policy, resulting in 
unhurried movement on Brazil’s part during initial 
discussions on integration with Argentina in 1984.  This 
fact was not lost on the Argentines, nor was the increased 
emphasis these meetings received after civilian elections 
in Brazil. 
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In January 1984, we started discussions with 
Itamaraty [Brazilian Foreign Ministry] on the 
issue of economic integration.  They were not so 
keen at the beginning, but there has been a sharp 
reversal coinciding with the coming to power of 
Sarney (Fournier, 1999). 
If viewed irrespectively of other data, these outlying 
events appear to contradict the hypothesis that  
civil-military relations were a necessary first step to 
regional security.  However, with a broader view these few 
interstate agreements pale in comparison to the dramatic 
increase in cooperative measures that emerge after 1985 and 
beyond as noted in Chapter II.  In short, these measures, 
prior to civilian rule, did not constitute a paradigm shift 
in foreign policy approaches.   
B. TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY, MILITARY SUBJUGATION TO 
CIVILIAN RULE AND FOREIGN POLICY REVERSAL 
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With transitions to democracy in the mid-1980s and 
increasing military subordination to civilian rule, a shift 
began in the strategic thinking of Argentina and Brazil.  
There was a resolution of the hostility of previous decades 
and an emergence of regional cooperative security.  
Military regimes justified their existence by means of 
heightened propaganda, stressing a potential national 
threat posed by neighboring nations.  This fueled military 
autonomy, increased defense spending and acted as a barrier 
to any semblance of regional cooperation.  Once civilian 
control was established, civilians had an interest in 
downplaying nationalistic foreign policies, which only 
contributed to the military’s power.  In addition, as the 
next chapter will show in more detail, the military’s 
nationalistic views undermined civilian efforts to promote 
economic integration with its neighbors.  The following 
sections examine Argentina and Brazil, and in turn, address 
the emergence of civilian rule and policy transformations 
that accompanied military subordination. 
1. Argentina  
Argentina turned away from military autonomy in 1983 
and to democratic, civilian command of the armed forces.  
President Alfonsín, elected in 1983, ran on a campaign 
platform that advocated justice for crimes committed and 
promised to bring the military to trail.  Facilitated in 
this by the Falklands/Malvinas defeat, he faced a fractured 
military institution and severely lacked public support.  
Alfonsín began the democratic transition, and with it a 
metamorphosis of foreign policy, while he simultaneously 
labored to reduce military influences in government, and 
with that reduction, any opposition to his foreign policy 
reforms.   
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Raúl Alfonsín was distinctly aware of his country’s 
cycle of military rule since the 1930s, and more 
specifically, how the military manipulated foreign policy 
into “an instrument for legitimizing and perpetuating their 
practices and rule” (Fournier, 43).  In order to break this 
cycle and consolidate civilian rule during a time when 
military regimes still dominated Argentina’s neighbors, 
Alfonsín pressed a radical platform of democracy and 
cooperation.  During his tenure, Alfonsín approved the 
Beagle Channel Treaty (1985), worked to resolve border 
disputes and increased ties with his Brazilian counter-
parts.  However, the Holy Week Rebellion of 1987 revealed 
that Alfonsín lacked total control over the military and he 
conceded to restrict the scope of his policy changes.  The 
political situation was drastically different when 
President Carlos Menem took office.  He saw an opportunity 
to capitalize on the military’s vulnerability from 
convictions for human rights violations committed during 
the “Dirty War.”  Menem exerted his authority by offering a 
quid pro quo.  He pardoned convicted officers and in return 
gained their alliance.  Faced with an economic crisis, he 
solidified civilian control and reduced military budgets by 
7.6% from 1989 to 1993 (Trinkunas, 2000).  The public had 
lost confidence in the armed forces’ leadership and with 
the military’s near acquiescence to avoid conviction, Menem 
was free to consolidate the foreign policy changes Alfonsín 
had begun and continue with an even more significant 
revision of national security policy.  To this end, he 
stated that Argentina had no enemies other than non-state 
aggressors.  At first, this was a somewhat unpopular and 
politically risky policy, but it was indicative of the 
change in Argentine philosophy.   
In a desire to change the Argentine international 
image, Menem executed a series of calculated domestic 
political moves.  Among these, he proved the nationalistic 
mindset of previous generations was outdated.  Neighboring 
countries were not necessarily enemies, but rather 
potential allies due to proximity and shared circumstance.  
The Argentina military tempered any objections due to their 
weakened political position and shrinking force structure.  
These preliminary steps achieved, Menem positioned to move 
forward quickly with his foreign policy or that of building 
Argentina into a responsible, peaceful member of the 
international community.   
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2. Brazil   
Brazil lacked the defining moments of the “Dirty War” 
and the Malvinas conflict to discredit its military which 
resulted in a slower turnover of power between the military 
and civilian leaders after the democratic transition in 
1985.  Military tutelage forced newly elected civilians to 
proceed moderately with their foreign policy agendas, but 
as civilians increased their power over time, policy 
proportionately became more cooperative.    
The first democratic administration, under President 
Sarney (1985-1990), confronted an uphill struggle to fend 
off military tutelage.  Not faced with defeat at the hands 
of the British or concerned about sweeping criminal charges 
because of human rights violations, the Brazilian military 
was able to exert control over the transition to civilian 
rule.  In addition, the lack of disdain slowed the rate at 
which military attitudes faded from public opinion.  Brazil 
was slow to institutionalize a ministry of defense, and for 
some time, retained a military influence in state 
intelligence agencies and legislative matters.  As a 
result, the military was able to subvert efforts to change 
paradigms and form new policy. 
Sarney’s successor, Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-
1992), enacted modifications to many domestic and foreign 
policies, as well as strengthened civilian rule.  
Economically, his administration privatized state 
businesses, sought price stabilization and opened the 
Brazilian economy.  With respect to Argentina, he pursued 
closer ties.  In a public display before the Brazilian 
press, he shut down nuclear weapons programs, and took a 
  34
giant step toward improving those relations (Gordon, 208).  
Collor’s efforts led to a bilateral agreement between the 
nations prohibiting nuclear weapons development (1990).  
The military’s autonomous influence in many government 
agencies in the early 1990s, specifically the Brazilian 
National Intelligence Service (SNI), presented Collor with 
a significant challenge.  Collor abolished the SNI and 
created the SAE (Secretariat for Strategic Affairs) under 
civilian leadership.  This transformation, albeit of 
limited effect (Zaverucha, 88), was an important step 
toward greater civilian control.  Overall, Collor opposed 
the military and set out to attack their prerogatives but 
he lacked political support and was in office for far too 
short a period to make any lasting changes.  He was 
impeached for corruption after only ten months.   
Cooperation in the area of nuclear policy deepened 
over time with increasing civilian rule and resulted in a 
multitude of accords approved between 1985 and 1997.  The 
Foz de Iguazú Declaration, signed in 1985, was a joint 
declaration on nuclear policy.  These agreements also 
include The Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy (28 
November 1990), Argentine (1993) and Brazilian (1995) 
participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime and 
the ratification of the Treaty of Tlateloco (Whitescarver, 
1997). 
Presidents Franco and Cardoso continued to struggle 
with the level of civilian jurisdiction over the military, 
just as their predecessors.  By the mid-1990s, civilians 
had not solidified their control, even though military 
occupation of cabinet level positions waned, as did its 
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tutelage over foreign policy.  As a result of increased 
civilian control, the Franco and Cardoso administrations 
were able to sign an unprecedented number of security and 
economic agreements, as well as increase military-to-
military activity between Argentina and Brazil.  However, 
Brazil’s tempered response to Argentina’s call for a common 
MERCOSUR Defense System illustrates the lack of complete 
civilian control.  Although receptive to the idea, which 
began in 1997 with the Permanent Mechanism of Consultation 
and Coordination on Defense and Security Affairs between 
Menem and Cardoso, Brazil has been hesitant to accept 
further measures, while Argentina has been more aggressive.  
In sum, Argentine and Brazilian relations under their 
respective military juntas were highly suspicious and 
hostile.  The military autonomists inflated the security 
threat by regional countries out of domestic political 
necessity.  However, these military regimes eventually 
began to lose power.  In Argentina, this was rapid and a 
direct result of political and military defeats.  For 
Brazil, the turnover was more gradual and controlled by the 
military.  In both cases, when civilian control emerged, 
policy altered to a less confrontational more cooperative 
philosophy. 
Overall, by examining security policy under the 
military and comparing it to the evolution of security 
policy under civilian rule, this chapter demonstrated the 
connection between civil-military relations and security 
policy.  Specifically, the military opposed attempts by 
civilian presidents to adopt a more cooperative security 
paradigm because it threatened their existence.  For 
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presidents who served concurrently with comparatively weak 
military organizations, the security changes were more 
significant and flowed more rapidly.  For administrations 
forced to exist during a period of unstable civil-military 
relations, the change and its rate of occurrence was 
tempered.  This constitutes a major portion of this thesis 
in which military autonomy inhibited security cooperation 
between Argentina and Brazil and overcoming this predicated 
a cooperative security environment. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter highlighted two major themes concerning 
the impact of civil-military relations on levels of 
security cooperation.  First, under military rule, 
Argentine and Brazilian foreign policy would classify as 
anything but cooperative.  The military regime 
propagandized a national security threat which served to 
strengthen its power and justify its leadership.  Second, 
civilian control emerged in the early to mid-1980s and 
almost immediately Argentine foreign policy shifted to a 
less confrontational more cooperative philosophy.  The 
change was more gradual but no less striking in Brazil, 
matching the more gradual assertion of civilian control 
over the military.  Overall, by the end of the 1990s, the 
paradigm shift in both countries was unmistakable.  
Military influences in foreign policy formation 
contribute to a defensive stance, less apt to participate 
in regional cooperative security agreements.   
[Nations with] higher levels of military 
autonomy...have moved more slowly, while nations 
with lower levels of military autonomy...have 
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IV. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY 
Civil-military relations only explain part of the 
puzzle concerning the emergence of cooperative security.  
It clarifies the feature that for years prohibited the 
emergence of security cooperation between Argentina and 
Brazil: autocratic military rulers that promoted 
antagonistic geopolitical thinking.  It cannot, however, 
explain what motivated civilians to pursue cooperative 
security with such fervor.  This thesis proposes that 
economic integration reveals the remaining pieces.  That is 
to say, once military tutelage no longer inhibited civilian 
leaders, something caused them to push their countries 
toward integration, or that of a changing world economy and 
their respective countries’ dwindling share in that 
economy.  In the end, the economic unification of Argentina 
and Brazil resulted in a high degree of mutual 
interdependence.  This economic interdependence, along with 
a change in civil-military relations, gave rise to a 
cooperative security zone.   
For generations South American countries wrestled with 
poor economic performance.  Characterized as economically 
dependent, Southern Cone nations have a history beset with 
economic inequality, low savings rates, over dependence on 
foreign investment and disappointing exports.  Fiscal 
instability in the region has relegated South America to a 
position on the periphery of the mainstream international 
economy.  In the early 1980s, newly elected civilians 
proposed the notion that a regional trading block would 
alleviate fiscal stagnation and hyperinflation.  Infused 
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with authority after subjugating the armed forces, these 
new civilian presidents received an opportunity to test 
their economic and foreign policy theories.  Security 
cooperation resulted from the economic integration called 
for by civilian policy changes.  Presidents faced with the 
demands of an international economic system evolving toward 
trading blocks, coupled with lackluster economic 
performance, hyperinflation and an inability to compete 
globally joined their economies.  Through economic 
integration, civilian ministers ensured markets for their 
exports and combined their resources for a greater share of 
the world economy.  When this economic integration began to 
produce positive results, presidents pushed for improved 
integration in other areas, specifically regional security, 
in an effort to dispel any possible threat to the 
partnership that was beginning to relieve their economic 
plight.  In addition, increased communication acted as a 
confidence building measure, for when government and 
business leaders were forced to correspond in order to 
facilitate economic integration, animosity toward and 
distrust of neighbors dissipated.  In this way, economic 
interdependence contributed to the emergence of regional 
cooperative security between Argentina and Brazil. 
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This chapter describes the mutually reinforcing 
process of economic integration and security cooperation in 
Argentina and Brazil.  It begins by framing the global 
economic environment of the period, the Southern Cone’s 
economic situation at the time, and the desire of newly 
elected presidents to make a change for the better.  
Second, it shows an increased level of economic 
interdependence between Argentina and Brazil from 1980 to 
2000, measured by means of increased foreign investment and 
trade, as well as changes in tariff patterns.  Third, it 
illustrates how economic interdependence was responsible 
for the initial security cooperation between these two 
countries and how this interdependence deepened over time 
and led to security cooperation.  It does so by reviewing 
presidential and foreign policy officials’ statements 
linking the desire for increased economic opening in order 
to cure fiscal ills to the reason for pushing regional 
cooperative security agreements. 
A. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND LATIN AMERICA  
Latin American economic integration of the late 
twentieth century examined against the backdrop of the 
period’s international environment reveals three watershed 
events that conspired to change the world’s economic 
setting, and cause Southern Cone nations to question their 
past fiscal theories and to make radical adjustments.  
These three events are (1) U.S. assumption as the world’s 
single superpower, (2) the emergence of a North American 
Free Trade Agreement and (3) the increased cohesion of the 
European Community.   
The U.S. victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War 
and Iraq in the Persian Gulf signaled a transformation in 
international politics.  With the United States the world’s 
only superpower, U.S. hegemony required acceptance by other 
nations.   
...A ‘unipolar moment’ in which there was little 
choice but to come to terms with the realities of 
U.S. power; and that economic globalization had 
undercut the viability of existing economic 
policies... questioning existing economic models 
based on ISI, [Import Substitution 
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Industrialization] high tariffs, and [a] large 
role for the state, and moving towards market 
liberalism (Hurrell, 247). 
The underlying point in Andrew Hurrell’s quote is that 
there was a change in global economics at about the time of 
the Cold War’s end.  This change caused political leaders 
world wide to re-think a generation’s worth of fiscal 
policy.  Latin America was not exempt from this.  The 
United States, although the world’s single superpower, had 
fallen from producing one-third of the world’s goods (1950) 
to approximately only one-fifth (Lawrence, Preface).  In 
this way, the absence of American economic dominance, 
coupled with its hegemonic lead toward regional trading 
blocks (NAFTA), altered the economic landscape from 
unilateralism and multilateralism to regionalism, with an 
emphasis on deeper integration.  
The emergence of a North American Free Trade Agreement 
between Mexico, Canada and the U.S., as well as the 
momentum gained by the European Common Market, drastically 
changed the prospects for trade.  Southern Cone countries, 
already inhabiting the economic periphery, faced 
competition with stronger North American and European 
trading blocks.  This prospect threatened Argentine and 
Brazilian politicians as they viewed themselves being 
“potentially ignored” by these countries (Cason, 27).  Many 
government officials, in both Argentina and Brazil, now 
realized that economic integration was necessary to 
maintain, if not build on their already shrinking piece of 
the international market.   
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In addition, the economic condition of the region has 
been bleak since the 1980s and leaders were desperate for 
new approaches to solve their economic problems.  Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) had ceased working and 
even contributed to the economic collapse of some Latin 
American countries (Nogués, 297 and Manzetti, 189).  
Inflation was also rampant in Argentina and Brazil.  These 
domestic problems, combined with the international trends 
already described, led civilian leaders to view cooperation 
as necessary for prosperity.  This took on a strategic 
importance and out-weighed the security concerns of the 
past that cast neighbors as enemies instead of trading 
partners (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995).  The call for 
integration was one of the essential impetuses for the 
creation of the Southern Cone Common Market. 
Beginning in the 1980s, national security departed 
traditional sovereignty issues and became defined by 
hemispheric tranquility and cooperation.  The end of the 
Cold War combined with the transition to civilian rule and 
marginalized the military domestically.  Politically 
impotent, the military could no longer mobilize against 
perceived threats and this allowed for a change in mindset.  
The economic crisis and opening of Latin America coincided 
with this paradigm shift, and economic success through 
interdependence became the mechanism to achieve a newly 
defined security. 
Until democratic transitions, civilian officials were 
helpless against military authoritarianism with its 
combative, nationalistic paradigms.  With a turnabout in 
civil-military relations, empowered civilians were ready to 
make adjustments for the better or changes toward economic 
integration.  By the mid-1980s, both Argentine President 
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Alfonsín and newly elected Brazilian President Sarney 
understood the need for change and the merits of 
cooperation.  The current 
...economic, monetary, and commercial guidelines, 
as well as the mechanisms devised to handle 
international relations in these fields, have 
fully proven by now that they are incapable of 
coping with the pressure of our times (Alfonsín, 
1985 Speech).  
They acted to align the Southern Cone with the rest of 
the world by taking initial steps away from their common 
history of distrust, toward cooperation and the beginning 
of what would become a Southern Cone trading block, and 
prove to be Latin America’s most effective economic 
integration.   
B. MEASURES OF GROWTH AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
Beginning in the 1980s, Southern Cone countries 
experienced a shift in strategic thinking.  Clearly,  
...the alfonsinista administration firmly 
believed that democratic consolidation in 
Argentina was intimately linked to good 
performance of democratic institutions in the 
economic sphere (Fournier, 51).   
This contributed to the development of MERCOSUR, the 
Cone’s best attempt at integration and cooperation. 
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The 1991 signing of the MERCOSUR agreement was the 
culmination of several years of economic rapprochement.  
Between 1985 and 1988, Argentina and Brazil signed numerous 
economic accords.  The Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA) originally signed in 1968 was 
rejuvenated in 1985.  The Argentine-Brazilian Economic 
Integration Program (ABEIP), signed in July 1986, followed 
the Iguaçu Declaration signed in November 1985.  On April 
6, 1988 Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay agreed to the Act of 
Alvorada in addition to a multitude of other trade, 
transportation, and technology pacts between 1987 and 1988.   
Argentina and Brazil joined Uruguay and Paraguay in 
signing the Treaty of Asunción in March 1991 and created 
the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR).  For years, the 
Southern Cone traveled a slow road to economic integration 
and reform.  The level of success in this important area 
varied, but the trend was no matter how successful a single 
country was economically, they all still struggled to find 
their niche in the international market.  In an effort to 
overcome such hurdles, these four nations combined their 
resources and talents in MERCOSUR, and the result has been 
profound.  Today MERCOSUR represents the fourth-largest 
trading block in the world. 
MERCOSUR has led to both an increased level of 
economic interdependence between Argentina and Brazil, and 
an increase in economic well being of those countries.  
Four variables show the economic growth achieved because of 
MERCOSUR and the link between the economic growth and 
interdependence between Argentina and Brazil: (1) gross 
national product (GNP), (2) trade (specifically exports 
within MERCOSUR), (3) tariff levels, and (4) foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  Economic growth occurs because of 
integration between MERCOSUR nations, specifically 
Argentina and Brazil.  Each has become dependent on the 
other, to a greater or lesser extent, for economic 
survival.  
GDP offers an indicator of how the economic 
relationship has increased wealth and therefore 
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interdependence.  Taking an average before and after the 
signing of the Treaty of Asunción in 1991, Argentina 
experienced an average change in GDP of –0.9% (1981-1990).  
However, after MERCOSUR, they had an average growth of 
+5.5% (1991-1997).  Brazil experienced a similar, albeit, 
not as drastic expansion.  Average GDP growth was +1.4% 
(1981-1990) but rose to an average of +2.8% (1991-1997) in 
the following years (Inter-American Development Bank, 1995 
and Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1997).  Figure 3 provides an annual breakout of 
real per capita GDP growth rate as reported by the Agency 
for International Development.  Specifically from 1988 to 
1993, Argentina jumps from -3.3% to +4.8% for real per 
capita GDP, and Brazil goes from -1.8% to +4.5% between 
1988 and 1994.  This is a significant change when compared 
to the negative growth and inflation of the previous 
decade. 
 
Real Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Argentina -3.3 -8.3 -2.7 9.0 8.8 4.8 4.5 
Brazil -1.8 1.4 -5.7 -1.2 -2.3 2.7 4.5 
 
Figure 3.   Real Per Capita Growth Rate. 
(From: Agency for International Development, Gross 
Domestic Product – Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Congressional Information Service, 2001) 
  
Figure 4 represents Argentine and Brazilian exports to 
MERCOSUR countries, including Paraguay and Uruguay, as 
recorded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The 
striking increase in exports from pre-MERCOSUR to post-
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MERCOSUR in Argentina and Brazil is evident.  In 1983, 
Brazil accounted for only 4.3% of Argentina’s exports 
(1983).  That figure more than doubled by 1993.  Economists 
typically subscribe to the notion that an export surplus is 
one of the pillars of fiscal success.   
Exports within MERCOSUR have more than doubled as 
a share of total exports since 1990, with 
MERCOSUR absorbing around 30% of Argentina’s and 
22% of Brazil’s exports (Hurrell, 251).   
The trade explosion represented by Figure 4 indicates 
that just such an incident occurred because of the MERCOSUR 
agreement.  Further, these phenomena produced a certain 
amount of interdependency between these nations if they 
wish to continue on this prosperous road. 
 
Argentine & Brazilian Exports to MERCOSUR Countries (in 
millions of US dollars) 
 Argentina Brazil 
1985 668 990 
1986 895 1,176 
1987 769 1,388 
1988 875 1,637 
1989 1,428 1,367 
1990 1,833 1,249 
1991 1,978 2,309 
1992 2,327 4,097 
1993 3,684 5,397 
1994 4,803 5,922 
1995 6,522 6,154 
1996 7,802 7,338 
1997 8,996 9,567 
 
Figure 4.   Argentine and Brazilian Exports to 
MERCOSUR Countries. 
(From: Jeffery Cason, “On the Road to Southern Cone 
Economic Integration” in Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs, Spring 2000) 
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For nations exporting goods among other ways, income 
is generated.  If a nation, beset by a history of economic 
difficulty, suddenly experiences a boost because of a rush 
of targeted exports, then it is safe to assume that there 
is an amount of dependency with respect to that new export 
market for continued economic gains or at least until other 
markets can be opened.  MERCOSUR created that targeted 
market for exports.  Argentine and Brazilian exports 
experienced a fair amount of difficulty competing 
internationally against those of other trading blocks 
because countries within a trading block typically purchase 
goods from partner nations.  Prior to MERCOSUR, Argentina 
and Brazil lacked a similar market.  After MERCOSUR, these 
countries enjoyed the benefit of a partner inclined to 
purchase goods because of a reduced tariff and became 
dependent on that partner for continued income linked to 
future purchases. 
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Trade and tariffs signal rising interdependency within 
the Southern Cone.  During the 1990s, MERCOSUR was the 
largest and “most dynamic economic integration scheme” in 
Latin America with interregional exports making up 25% of 
the group’s total (Inter-American Development Bank, 2000).  
Tariffs were reduced for the most part in accordance with 
the agreement’s timetable in order to reach zero by 1995.  
Moreover, these nations have been working toward an 
agreement on a common automotive regime based on 
unrestricted intra-zone free trade since 1994.  Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) has also increased because of the 
Southern Cone Common Market.  The European Union’s (EU) FDI 
to Southern Cone countries was 54.6% of its total before 
the existence of the trading block.  After MERCOSUR that 
figure grew to 66.3% or approximately 4.7 billion dollars 
(Cason, 2000 and Manzetti, 2000).  FDI internal to MERCOSUR 
is also up.  Taking Chile, for example, Argentina and 
Brazil together account for 54.3% of Chile’s FDI, 
approximately 6.5 million dollars, in 1997.  Importantly, 
investment between Argentina and Brazil also grew.  Pre-
MERCOSUR, there were less than 20 Brazilian companies 
operating in Argentina.  By 1996 that figure grew to more 
than 400 investing 1 billion dollars annually.  
Approximately 80 Argentine businesses have returned the 
favor with about 250 million dollars in investments 
(Serrill, 1996).  
In sum, gross domestic product, trade and foreign 
direct investment all experienced a marked enlargement post 
MERCOSUR.  Conversely, tariffs decreased between partners.  
Argentina and Brazil relied on one another for economic 
well being, thus contributing to interdependence.  Simply 
put, without its partner, the means for increasing exports 
and investments as well as continued growth, would be lost.  
C. POLITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND 
REGIONAL SECURITY 
Correcting economic stagnation and raging inflation in 
both Argentina and Brazil required approaches other than 
those utilized under military autonomy.  Neither Argentina 
nor Brazil was strong enough alone, and because regional 
cooperation had worked in other instances, both nations 
committed to economic integration.  Integration entailed 
uniting resources for a greater combined share of the 
international economy and constructing a tariff free 
trading zone to enhance exports.  Two policy theories 
accompanied this process.  First, having overcome a generic 
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mistrust of the other, national security for Argentina and 
Brazil became synonymous with economic growth.  Security 
was not building a military to defeat your neighbor in 
combat.  Rather, security was building a stable, prosperous 
economy.  Secondly, success of a common market necessitated 
the reduction of possible threats to its existence, namely, 
geopolitical and nationalistic attitudes that would push 
competition instead of cooperation and advocate isolation 
instead of integration.  Therefore, what began as economic 
integration, spread to include regional security measures, 
increased confidence-building measures, military-to-
military exchanges and reduced tensions over nuclear power.  
In this way, civilian leaders sought to eradicate any 
threat to the foreseen profits of economic integration.  
The following section reviews presidential decisions of the 
era, highlighting economic policies and then linking 
economic cooperation with changes in security. 
1. Economic Policies 
Presidents Alfonsín of Argentina and Sarney of Brazil 
met in November of 1985 and cemented their agreement to 
promote political cooperation and economic integration.  
The initiatives that sprang forth from this meeting formed 
the corner stone of Argentine and Brazilian cooperative 
security.   
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In 1989, Carlos Menem, elected President of Argentina, 
continued his country’s economic liberalization and 
regional integration.  The Law of Economic Emergency, the 
State Reform Law and the Comisión Bicameral de la Reforma 
del Estado (CBRE), all of which dealt with the sale and 
privatization of state-owned business, as well as the 
dollarization of the Argentina peso, occurred during his 
presidency (Blake, 7-8 and Llanos, 71).  Menem and his 
economic minister, Domingo Cavallo, pushed for continued 
economic liberalization and integration deemed necessary 
for economic prosperity as did the previous Alfonsín 
administration.  In turn, they became principal architects 
in the MERCOSUR agreement. 
During his presidency, Menem worked with three 
Brazilian counterparts: Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-
1992), Itamar Franco (1992-1994), and Fernando Cardoso 
(1995-2000).  All, to a greater or lesser extent, shared a 
similar vision of a tranquil and integrated Southern Cone, 
with newfound economic viability.  
President Collor stepped away from traditional 
competitive foreign security and economic policies and 
embraced change and regional cooperation. 
...The exhaustion of the industrialization model 
of the last decades, the new [Collor] government 
was compelled to sacrifice some of the classic 
positions of Brazilian nationalism in its 
external behavior in its zeal to improve its 
position and extricate itself from the difficulty 
in which it found itself (Seabra de Cruz, 140).  
The positions de Cruz refers to are protective, 
competitive economic policies of the military juntas.  This 
attitude change persisted through the subsequent 
administrations of the 1990s as economic interdependence 
grew between Argentina and Brazil during the Franco and 
Cardoso presidencies. 
During the Itamar Franco government, Brazil’s 
foreign policy went through a process of 
adjustment, influenced by two factors: first, the 
growing impact of economic stabilization on the 
country’s international affairs...  Outstanding 
  51
priorities in Brazilian foreign policy were 
active participation in the Southern Cone Common 
Market (MERCOSUR), the creation of a South 
American Free Trade Area (SAFTA)...  The Cardoso 
government has demonstrated its intention to 
maintain Itamaraty’s ascendance in the 
formulation and implementation of Brazil’s 
foreign policy (Hirst, 111).  
2. Linking Economic Integration and Security 
Economic cooperation led to security cooperation in 
two primary ways.  First, civilian leaders faced with 
economic crisis, redefined security to mean prosperity and 
reached out to their neighbors. 
The deep economic crisis in which the Southern 
Cone countries found themselves [...and] their 
increasingly marginal role in world trade, took 
on the character of a security issue...Thus, 
security took on a broader connotation: that of 
enhancing domestic competitiveness in the world 
economy, penetrating new markets, and improving 
one’s bargaining position in trade negotiations.  
Renewing the emphasis on regional integration 
could provide the means by which to satisfy these 
security concerns (Manzetti, 189). 
Former regimes (pre-1980) defined national security in 
terms of military preparedness for combat.  Civilian 
regimes (post-1980) redefined national security to equate 
to economic stability.  Civilians also felt “security and 
defense must follow the trail carved by economics” because 
they were mutually re-enforcing, (Pion-Berlin 2000, 51) so 
much so, that military heads, sometimes coerced, other 
times more willingly, began to examine methodologies to 
expand the economic integration of MERCOSUR to military 
forces.  According to General Martin Balza, former 
Argentine Army Chief of Staff (Pion-Berlin 2000, 51), “It 
is undeniable that the launching of MERCOSUR brings the 
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military to think about all that refers to integration from 
a military point of view.”  
Second, economic integration contributed to 
cooperative regional security by creating channels of 
communication between previously distrustful countries.  
Whereas military planning for combat did not necessarily 
lend itself to bilateral discussion, security via economic 
integration required it.  For economic integration to 
succeed, Argentine and Brazilian governments had to 
establish ties and work out mutually beneficial economic 
arrangements.  Since MERCOSUR, Argentina and Brazil have 
established an almost continuous channel of communication.  
Communication allows for an understanding of intentions.  
This type of diplomatic transparency reduced distrust and 
brought Argentina and Brazil closer to cooperative 
security.  As a result, Argentina and Brazil signed a 
memorandum of understanding for consultation and 
coordination during a two-day working meeting between 
Cardoso and his Argentine counterpart Carlos Menem.  Then 
General Alberto Cardoso, the head of the Brazilian military 
administration, reported that Argentina and Brazil “pledge 
to maintain strategic balance and encourage the same kind 
of balance with other South American countries.”  This 
agreement established a mechanism for consultation between 
the two countries.  
Once economic integration mandated a bilateral 
dialogue, the convergence of Argentine and Brazilian 
visions soon followed.  This is not to say that either 
country has abandoned its own identity.  Nevertheless, 
economic interdependence joined the fate of these two 
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nations and merged their strategic outlooks.  Time 
International reported Cardoso as saying, “this agreement 
was a ‘historical landmark’ which showed that the two 
countries have a ‘common strategic vision.’” 
MERCOSUR, as well as the other economic agreements 
between Argentina and Brazil, are reaping success.  
Cooperative attitudes have enveloped the MERCOSUR partners 
as reflected in foreign policy statements by both nations’ 
presidents.  This, in turn, is self re-enforcing.  Economic 
necessity called Argentina and Brazil to integration and as 
cooperation supplied positive results, the attitude spread 
influencing other foreign policy issues.  Antagonistic 
attitudes of the previous generation gave way to 
collaboration, not just in economics but with national 
security as well.  Prosperity and security became 
integrated and mutually supporting in the minds of policy 
officials.  Thus, cooperative security protected the 
prosperity brought about by economic integration and in 
turn, economic stability added to the desire to cooperate 
across the board which resulted in a cyclical 
reinforcement.     
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
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Economic integration achieved by Southern Cone 
countries led, in turn, to mutual interdependence.  
Released from the binds of military autonomy, many 
government leaders realized they needed to cooperate 
economically rather than compete militarily with their 
neighbors.  The resulting interdependence consolidated the 
shift in attitudes between traditionally rival nations and 
the success of this union increased activity related to 
security cooperation.  After regime changes of 1983 in 
Argentina and 1985 in Brazil, civilians considered a wider 
range of concerns when formulating foreign and economic 
policies than had their processors.  Linking the two 
together, they desired to foster an attitude of shared 
circumstances in the mutual economic plight among Southern 
Cone nations and thus allow the governments to drop their 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Southern Cone developed into a democratic, 
civilian controlled, economically integrated region, where 
its members, specifically Argentina and Brazil, exist under 
the umbrella of cooperative security.  The influences of 
this cooperation, although pervasive do not, as of yet, 
affect all aspects of the state.  Southern Cone militaries, 
interdependent and collaborative are not integrated, and 
the proposal for a common defensive force for MERCOSUR by 
Argentina is potentially decades away from realization.  
Regardless, the nations of this area have progressed light-
years from their former existence as warring, distrustful 
neighbors.   
There is ample evidence to support the notion of an 
emergent cooperative security zone between Argentina and 
Brazil.  Chapter II presented data showing a paradigm shift 
in foreign policy, a marked rise in multilateral 
peacekeeping missions and an increase in security 
agreements between Argentina and Brazil.  Specific national 
security and foreign policy reversals ushered in the new 
era of cooperative security: (1) Argentine Presidents 
Alfonsín and Menem’s foreign policy statements, most 
critically, that Argentina has no foreign adversaries, and 
(2) Brazil’s defense industry reductions and foreign policy 
reversals under Franco and Cardoso, specifically on nuclear 
cooperation which enhanced regional peace. 
What then is the cause of this security community?  
Chapters III and IV addressed potential causes such as 
civilian control of the military and economic integration 
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respectively.  These variables were examined because of 
their tremendous bearing on foreign policy and the apparent 
dissent in the literature about their relative significance 
in contributing to Southern Cone cooperative security.   
This thesis found that a high degree of military 
control in a government has adverse effects on regional 
security.  The military mindset is often defensive, even 
distrustful, and typically aggressive.  Interstate 
cooperation can diminish to the point of non-existence when 
the government espouses such attitudes because military 
personnel hold office or exercise a high degree of 
political control.  Surely, this was the case in Latin 
America up until the 1980s.  When the election of civilian 
leaders coincided with the apparent emergence of regional 
cooperative security in the Southern Cone, it become 
increasingly tempting for academics to attribute this to 
civilian control.  While civil-military relations explain 
why the armed forces were no longer an obstacle to security 
cooperation, they do not explain civilian motivations for 
pursuing cooperative security.  
What were the civilian motivations that coalesced with 
democratic control of the military in order to increase 
security cooperation?  Economic integration in response to 
hyperinflation and a shrinking share of the international 
market explains the civilian impetus toward security 
cooperation.  The most telling example of this was the 
creation of MERCOSUR.  Argentina and Brazil joined Paraguay 
and Uruguay in signing the Treaty of Asuncion creating the 
Southern Cone Common Market.  The economic hardship of 
Argentina and Brazil forced the civilian leadership to take 
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a different tact from the nationalistic stance of the 
former military regime.  Chapter IV points out that 
economic considerations were the impetus behind the 
integration and that they were responsible for initial 
steps toward security cooperation and its continued 
deepening over time. 
The success of MERCOSUR in turn, has increased 
activity related to security cooperation.  
Neighboring countries whose economic fates have 
become inexorably intertwined realize that they 
must inhibit military provocation that could 
cause armed conflict and thereby undermine 
economic gains (Pion-Berlin 2000, 62). 
Most succeeding treaties between the two partners 
serve to deepen economic integration and foster hemispheric 
peace. 
Civil-military control and economic integration are 
not end-states, but rather exist in degrees along a 
continuum.  For civil-military relations, this continuum 
stretches from total military autonomy, through a gradation 
of elected civilian leadership with military tutelage, to 
the aspiration of complete subjugation of the armed forces.  
Economic integration spans the range from a simple customs 
union to a common market, absent of any restrictions 
against member nations (Pion-Berlin 2000, 44).  Argentina 
and Brazil have been and continue to progress along these 
linear developmental paths.  Each continuum of development 
feeds off and contributes to the progression of the other.  
The beginnings of Southern Cone regional security rest with 
the initial diplomatic and political agreements between the 
newly elected civilians of Argentina and Brazil.  The 
desire for economic stability resulted in the creation of 
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the Southern Cone Common Market.  Finally, security 
cooperation stemmed from a need to reduce any potential 
military threat to economic integration.  In Argentina, 
where a discredited military totally lost public support, 
security cooperation progressed more rapidly.  In Brazil, 
where the military was still powerful, cooperation moved 
more slowly. 
In Argentina, the military suffered two debilitating 
defeats in the early 1980s.  The first was the loss of 
public support because of the “Dirty War” and the second 
their defeat by the British in the Falklands/Malvinas War 
in 1982.  The result was twofold.  Civilian leaders quickly 
expanded their influence in government policymaking and the 
military’s size and political control rapidly shrunk.  
Military subjugation to civilian control removed the armed 
forces as an obstacle to security cooperation and the 
civilian desires to improve the economy motivated the shift 
in policy toward economic and security cooperation.  
In Brazil, advances came at a significantly subdued 
rate, where the military was a principal architect of the 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy.  Success or 
failure in subjugating the military depends in large part 
on the negotiations between authoritarian leaders and the 
emerging democratic opposition during the transition 
period.  Alfred Stepan writes, 
In a democratic regime the degree of articulated 
contestation by the military is strongly affected 
by the extent to which there is intense dispute 
or substantial agreement between the military and 
the incoming government concerning a number of 
issues.  
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When Brazil broke from authoritarian rule, the 
subsequent years proved difficult for civilian leaders in 
their effort to check military power.  The Brazilian armed 
forces “succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some 
of the political regimes that have arisen from the process 
of transformation” (Zaverucha, 283).  The result, unlike in 
Argentina where the military lost most, if not all its 
political power, was a Brazilian military that maintained a 
prominent role in the formation of government policy.  The 
leaders of the armed forces continued to hold, well after 
democratization, six seats in the cabinet, as well as 
positions on the National Security Council and state 
intelligence agency, and influence with the legislature.  
The extent of military prerogatives after the democratic 
transition slowed the pace at which Brazil accepted 
cooperative security initiatives compared to Argentina.   
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In sum, civilian controls over the military and 
economic integration are both necessary for a region of 
cooperative security, and neither of them alone is 
sufficient.  Civilian economic theories and cooperative 
policy initiatives would never have come to fruition if 
military autonomy went unbroken because such initiatives 
ran contradictory to the geopolitical philosophy of the 
military and their rationale for staying in power.  
Nevertheless, military subordination alone would not have 
guaranteed interstate cooperative security for there are 
numerous nations that exist under democratic civilian 
control of the military without being members of a regional 
security block.  It is necessary to understand civilian 
motives for pursuing regional security cooperation.  In 
Argentina and Brazil, civilian leaders sought to cure 
economic crises through cooperation and integration with 
their neighbors sharing similar circumstances.  Argentine-
Brazilian economic integration was a goal pursued by 
civilian presidents.  Cooperative security followed from 
this same goal as a way to defeat the political opposition 
to their cooperative theories from geopolitical thinkers, 
by changing the national mindset and ensuring continued 
economic success through increased ties and continued 
communication attributable to economic integration.     
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
What lessons come from these experiences in Latin 
America and can be applied to America’s foreign policy 
initiatives for the region in order to enhance their 
effectiveness?  Simply, there is an inseparable linkage 
between economic integration and cooperative security for 
countries of the Southern Cone.  Prosperity and safety go 
hand-in-hand.  Due to increased integration in the Southern 
Cone, nations are less likely to take action or implement 
policies that adversely affect their neighbor on whom they 
depend for economic stability.  The United States should 
take heed and not take any measures that undermine the 
process of economic and security integration that has 
occurred between Argentina and Brazil. 
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One U.S. policy measure that has caused friction 
between Argentina and Brazil is the designation of 
Argentina as a primary non-NATO ally of the United States.  
As a type of recognition, or reward, for Argentina’s 
substantial assistance with international peacekeeping 
missions, specifically Yugoslavia, and for support in the 
Persian Gulf War, the United States bestowed this 
unofficial status on Argentina.  Argentina having sought 
this designation now sits between American interests and 
those of her MERCOSUR partners, specifically Brazil.  
Typically apt to follow the U.S. diplomatic lead in the 
hemisphere, Argentina has called for the construction of 
the common defensive organization for MERCOSUR.  A U.S. 
backed recommendation, because of the implications it could 
have on the drug war, it has received only moderate support 
from Brazil.   
Brazil would be a major player in any such security 
association, but is apt not to participate simply because 
it coincides with American interests, among other reasons.  
Unlike Argentina, Brazil is constantly attempting to reject 
American hegemony in the hemisphere.  This is a precarious 
position for Argentina.  As Pion-Berlin notes,  
...in its dealings with MERCOSUR, Argentina must 
simultaneously consider the impact of its 
decisions on its much-prized relationship with 
the United States” (Pion-Berlin 2000, 51).   
The United States would do well to sympathize with the 
Argentine dilemma and down play its normally dominant role.  
In the end, the U.S. may find that it can simultaneously 
improve its relationship with Brazil and support 
cooperative security in the hemisphere, while still 
realizing its own interests. 
A more moderate stance would be helpful to the United 
States’ position of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 
(FTAA).  The United States has continually pushed for an 
accelerated timetable with respect to the FTAA.  Brazil, 
however, has resisted.   
Just before the meeting [of the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas], President Cardoso characterized 
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the negotiations as one in which “Brazilian, 
Argentine, Paraguayan and Uruguayan negotiators 
sit together and speak through the representative 
of the country that holds the pro tempore 
presidency of MERCOSUR.  There is no individual 
position...This statement apparently was more 
than rhetoric.  One month before the ministerial 
meeting Belo Horizonte, the MERCOSUR partners 
agreed to present a common position in the FTAA 
talks that generally opposed the U.S. desire to 
speed up the negotiations (Cason, 36). 
Acknowledging that MERCOSUR countries are making 
unified decisions on this issue and that Brazil is setting 
the tone, a more tempered approach that ensures Brazil, as 
well as other Latin American nations of an American 
partnership and not dominance, would be more helpful in 
achieving U.S. trade policy goals.  
A less heavy-handed approach is required in Latin 
America.  Our priorities over the past few years appear to 
be correct.  The National Security Strategy for the United 
States (1999) rests on three pillars: (1) enhance America’s 
security, (2) bolster American economic prosperity and (3) 
promote democracy and human rights abroad.  Clearly, 
economic prosperity and enhancing democratic values, as 
well as human rights, have positive implications for Latin 
America. 
While the U.S. strategy addresses promoting America’s 
economy, its implementation in the Western Hemisphere, in 
addition to NAFTA and FTAA, will be: 
Assisting [in] the reform and recovery of banking 
sectors hurt by financial market turmoil over the 
past several years...  [And] to support the 
financial and economic reform efforts in Brazil 
and Argentina to reduce their vulnerability to 
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external shocks (National Security Strategy for 
the United States, 40).   
This is good for, as the research associated with this 
thesis showed, democratic control of the military, economic 
stability, integration and prosperity which are crucial to 
regional stability, another American security objective. 
There are implications for Argentina’s current 
economic crisis, most notably characterized by the threat 
of default on international loans (Economist and Economic 
Examiner, 2002).  Although such economic hardship probably 
will not accompany a back slide in cooperative security, it 
may slow down the rate at which security cooperation 
proceeds in the future.  It also presents an area for 
future study by presenting the opportunity to isolate the 
two variables and measure their degree of importance 
relative to each other.   
This thesis showed that civil-military relations and 
economic integration linked together to form an integral 
component of Southern Cone stability.  As previously noted, 
the Southern Cone cooperative security umbrella is not 
fully developed.  In particular, there is more to do in the 
area of inter-military confidence building.  Continuing, 
albeit subtle, diplomatic efforts by American Southern 
Command Forces to interact and foster this integration 
among Southern Cone militaries would encourage the 
expansion of MERCOSUR through its common defensive system.  
This could, in turn, increase regional cooperation and 
advance MERCOSUR, the region’s best hope for economic 
prosperity.  This means the U.S. must work to dispel the 
perception that MERCOSUR is a substantial challenge to 
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American hegemony and regional interests.  Regional 
cooperative security is flourishing in the Southern Cone of 
Latin America which results from the combined effect of 
civilian control over the military and economic integration 
because of MERCOSUR.  The U.S. must embrace the movement 
that is MERCOSUR and realize that its prosperity is aligned 
with the strategic goals of the U.S. for the region, and 
seek to interact with its member nations as hemispheric 
equals. 
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